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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines the corporate governance structure of publicly traded hospitality firms and 
determines whether the governance structure selected by these firms is consistent with minimizing 
monitoring and bonding costs dictated by the complexity of the business models. 
 
There is strong evidence that complex firms had larger board of directors, more outside board 
members, a greater fraction of CEO pay being variable, and more frequent occurrence of 
CEO/Chairman duality than simple firms. The results also present evidence of a positive 
relationship between firms that have the appropriate governance structures and the profitability 
and valuation of the firm. 
 
Keywords:  Corporate Governance; Profitability; Valuation; Hospitality Firms 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
he hospitality industry has undergone changes in its business model through the 1990s and 2000s.  
For example, in the lodging sector, there has been significant consolidation in the industry, leaving a 
few large firms that operate in several markets - time share, budget hotels, full service, and luxury 
brands.  Other major changes include purchases by private equity groups and innovative financing deals like real 
estate investment trust and its variants.  The structure of the lodging industry is also quite complex and varied.  The 
portfolio of hotels can include company-owned hotels, franchises, firms operated under management contracts, and 
time share (partial ownership) arrangements.  Thus, business models in this industry may require different 
governance structures from other service industries.   
 
The choice of corporate governance structure has implications for the management of the firm and well as 
firm value.  Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Williamson (1979) viewed the firm as a nexus of contracts and argued 
that the firm is organized such that the transaction costs of these contracts are minimized.  Faleye et al. (2011) found 
that outside board members increase the effectiveness of monitoring mangers but at the expense of weaker strategic 
advising.  Larcker et al. (2011) found that government regulations that would appear to strengthen governance 
structures - executive pay, proxy access and staggered board - appear to reduce shareholders’ wealth.  Other 
researchers have investigated the relationship between ownership structure and firm value (see Morck, Shleifer, & 
Vishny, 1988).  The argument posed by these researchers suggests that the level of monitoring and bonding of 
management will provide the requisite incentives for managers to make decisions that maximize shareholder wealth 
and minimize the agency costs due to managerial entrenchment. 
 
The focus of prior research on corporate governance structures was not on specific industries; few papers 
examined a particular industry.  Theories have been developed and empirical work done assuming that there is 
uniformity in optimal governance structures across industries and firm characteristics.  It is quite plausible that what 
is appropriate for a manufacturing firm is suboptimal for a financial firm or a service firm.  Similarly, optimal 
T 
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governance structure may vary according to the size and complexity of the firm.  Hence, having the optimal 
governance structure that will reduce agency costs and increase firm value and profitability is critically important for 
firms in the hospitality industry. 
 
In this paper, we seek to determine whether the corporate governance structure selected by publicly traded 
lodging and gaming firms are consistent with minimizing monitoring and bonding costs dictated by the more 
complex business models within these firms.   
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Following the scandals in many companies in the U.S. and other parts of the world in the 1990s and 2000s, 
much attention is being placed on corporate governance.  Having effective corporate governance systems in place is 
increasingly becoming a prerequisite for doing business both domestically and internationally.  The Organization of 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), for example, issued its “OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance” in 1999.  These principles are intended to assist member and non-member countries in evaluating and 
improving the legal, institutional, and regulatory framework for better corporate governance. Another international 
organization - the International Monetary Fund (IMF) - has mandated that corporate governance improvements be 
included in its debt-relief program.  According to Ariff et al. (2007), corporate governance is a mechanism that 
fosters increased confidence in the market and the economy.  Studies have shown that a good corporate governance 
system results in high corporate valuation and that good governance leads to a reduction in agency costs.  Khancel 
(2007) found that firms with high growth opportunities and high intangible assets have stronger governance. 
 
Alves and Barbot (2007) implied that governance structures for low-cost airlines are different from full-
service airlines.  The rationale here is that low-cost airlines require small and nimble governance structure that 
allows management to make rapid changes as the environment evolves.  Full-service airlines, with their complex 
business model, require a larger and more formal governance structure.  We extend this study of the airline industry 
to the lodging industry to see whether complex hospitality firms have significantly different governance structures 
than do simple hospitality firms. 
 
We considered two types of corporate governance structures - monitoring and bonding.  Thus, we 
hypothesize that board size, number of outsiders, chairman/CEO duality, and board committees would be proxies for 
board oversight.  That is, a larger board, greater number of outsiders, non duality, and the presence of audit and 
governance committees would be associated with greater monitoring of the CEO.  We also posit that CEO tenure is 
a proxy for CEO turnover, which substitutes for labor market monitoring.  We also hypothesize that the percentage 
of the CEO compensation - that is variable - could be a proxy for bonding as the greater the variable portion of the 
CEO’s compensation, the more likely the CEO’s action will be aligned with shareholders.   
 
Monitoring 
 
Studies have shown that the size of the board impacts the quality of corporate governance.  Coles et al. 
(2008) argued that larger boards with more outsiders can be favorable for complex firms for two reasons.  First, this 
board structure can provide for more extensive monitoring. Second, a larger and more diverse group of directors can 
provide the complex firms with a wider range of experiences/perspectives.  Stulz (1988) posited that higher debt 
levels can act as an effective managerial control tool.  Thus, Wen et al. (2002) and Abor (2007) found that a 
significantly larger board for higher leveraged firms is consistent with firms requiring greater monitoring.  On the 
other hand, Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Jensen (1993) argued that smaller boards are more effective and 
profitable because they have a better monitoring system and that board effectiveness will decline as the board size 
increases above a moderate number.  This latter argument would be consistent with the simpler firm having a 
smaller board. 
 
Helland and Sykuta (2005) maintained that when boards have a higher proportion of outside directors, they 
monitor management more effectively. Forbes and Milliken (1999) argued that outside directors tend to view the 
responsibilities of the directors as different from those of management and that inside directors view their 
responsibilities as an extension of their managerial responsibilities.  Brunninge et al. (2007) found that outside 
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directors are instrumental in establishing strategic changes in organizations.  Duchin et al. (2010) argued that outside 
directors are most beneficial to firm value when the cost of acquiring information about the firm is low.  Thus, not 
all firms will experience higher valuation with more outside directors. 
 
Dorata et al. (2008), Fama and Jensen (1983), and Abor (2007) stated that duality reduces board 
monitoring. This can lead to sub-optimal decision-making and a reduction in shareholders’ wealth. Further, Darus 
and Mohamad (2011) held that CEO duality was more prevalent in Malaysian firms that suffered financial distress 
after the Asian financial crisis in 1997.  Board decisions are not subject to much scrutiny when there is no separation 
of CEO and Chairman.  Hence, the separation of the CEO and the chairman should allow firms with more complex 
business issues to make better business decisions.  
 
Bonding 
 
Jensen and Murphy (1990) argued that including a variable portion in the CEO compensation should help 
to align managerial interests with those of shareholders. Bonding through compensation packages often can be less 
costly and more effective than direct monitoring.  Lippert and Williams (1995) provided some evidence that bonding 
through CEO compensation can operate as a substitute for, rather than the complement of, monitoring by the board 
of directors. Lippert and Mazur (1999) suggested that CEO compensation will vary depending on the type of firm.  
In their study of multinational corporations (MNC) and domestic firms (DC), they found that the CEOs of DC 
compensation had a stronger correlation with firm (equity) value than the CEOs of MNC.  This difference they 
attribute to the greater investment opportunities of MNCs.  Hence, firms that require greater levels of monitoring 
should structure their CEO pay with a greater percentage being variable.   
 
The Model 
 
Utilizing the literature on valuation, firm characteristics, and corporate governance structures, we 
developed a model that links firm characteristics and firm profitability/valuation.  Firms are deemed to be complex 
or simple based on their size, scope of business, and financing choice.  This partitioning of firms into simplex and 
complex is comparable to Alves and Barbot (2007) dividing their sample into full-service and low-cost airlines, as 
well as Coles’ et al. (2008) definition of simple and complex firms. In this model, complex firms are large, rely on 
significant debt financing, and have several lines of business. Each firm then decides on a particular governance 
structure - informal or formal.  A formal governance structure would include large boards with a significant number 
of independent/outside directors and, in general, more monitoring and bonding mechanisms.  Conversely, an 
informal governance structure would have smaller boards and a larger percentage of inside directors. Thus, simple 
firms with informal governance structure and complex firms with formal governance structure should have higher 
valuation/profitability.  On the other hand, simple firms with formal governance structures and complex firms with 
informal governance structure will result in low valuation/profitability (see Appendix A for schematic representation 
of the model). 
 
HYPOTHESES 
 
Based on the above, we present the first hypothesis H01 and the corresponding null H11: 
 
H01: There are no differences between the governance structure of complex firms and simple firms in the 
hospitality industry. 
 
H11: There are differences between the governance structure of complex firms and simple firms in the 
hospitality industry. 
 
Studies have shown that good corporate governance systems can reduce agency costs, resulting in higher 
corporate valuation.  Khancel (2007) found a strong correlation between firms with high growth opportunities and 
those with stronger governance systems.  Zahra and Pearce (1989) found a positive relationship between the 
percentage of outside directors and the performance of the firm.  Yermach (1996) found that firms that separated the 
functions of the CEO and chairman traded at higher price-to-book multiples.  De Andres et al. (2005) and Saikouras 
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et al. (2007) found that firms with a greater number of directors had lower firm values.  Further, Agrawal and 
Knoeber (1996) and Yermack (1996) found that lower firm value is associated with a greater number of outside 
directors. Duchin et al. (2010) argued that the relationship between firm value and outside director is dependent on 
the outside director’s information-gathering costs.  Thus, we present our second hypothesis: 
 
H02:  Firms with the appropriate corporate governance structures will not have higher levels of profitability than 
those with less appropriate corporate governance structures. 
 
H12: Firms with the appropriate corporate governance structures will have higher levels of profitability than 
those with less appropriate corporate governance structures.   
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
We obtained financial and corporate governance data from COMPUSTAT and Corporate Library found the 
WRDS website for the years 2001-2010.  We selected firms based on their primary SIC code 7011 – hotels and 
motels.  Financial statement data were obtained from the COMPUSTAT database and board and CEO data were 
obtained from the Corporate Library database and supplemented by SEC proxy statements.  The COMPUSTAT 
database produced several hundred firm years; however, the Corporate Library database had limited data, so our 
sample was reduced to 116 firm years comprising 21 different firms (see Appendix B for list of firms used). 
 
 We used factor analysis to identity a complexity variable (analogous to the advice variable in Coles et al., 
2008). Leverage (long-term debt/total assets), sales, and number of business/geographical segments were used for 
the factor analysis.  The factor analysis indicated that we needed two factors to measure complexity (factors with 
eigenvalues greater than or equal to 1).  One factor was positively correlated with leverage and negatively correlated 
with number of segments, while the other factor was highly positively correlated with firm size as measured by total 
assets and weakly positively correlated with number of segments and leverage.  A firm had multi segments if it had 
operations in different countries and/or if it operated in different business segments. Segment data were obtained 
from the COMPUSTAT database. 
 
We partitioned the sample based on the factor scores.  We computed the median value - the factor that was 
highly correlated with size.  We selected this factor as it has a more intuitive interpretation; firms that are larger have 
more segments and are more levered, being the more complex firms.  Complex firms were those whose factor scores 
were above the median and simple firms were those factor scores were below the median value
1
.  The non 
parametric test - Wilcoxon Rank Sum - as well as the parametric two sample t-tests, were used to determine whether 
there were any differences in total board size, number of outsiders, and the percentage of insiders on the board, 
duality, percentage shareholding of insiders, and the percentage of CEO pay that is variable. 
 
RESULTS 
 
The results are presented in Table 1.  Both the non-parametric and t-tests indicated that there are significant 
differences in total board size, and number of outsiders,  percentage of inside directors, the percentage of shares held 
by insiders, percentage of the CEO pay that is variable, and duality between complex (1) vs. simple firms (0).  That 
is, complex firms have larger boards than simple firms, as well as a large percentage of CEO pay that is variable. 
Also, the CEO and chairman are more likely the same person. The greater number of outsiders is also consistent 
with the argument presented in Helland and Sykuta (2005) and Forbes and Milliken (1999) - that outsiders are better 
monitors and advisors. 
 
The more frequent occurrence of duality for complex firms would suggest less monitoring of the CEO by 
the board, greater agency costs, and less incentives for the CEO to act in the best interest of the shareholders (Fama 
& Jensen, 1983; Jensen, 1983; Yermach, 1996; and Abor, 2007).  However, the much higher levels of variable pay 
(64% vs. 40%) provide substantial incentives to the CEO to act in the best interest of shareholders.  However, this is 
not entirely consistent with Jensen and Murphy (1990) who found that CEOs of smaller firms (assumed to be less 
                                                 
1 This methodology is consistent with Coles et al. (2008), Guay 1999, and Gaver and Gaver (1993), as cited in Coles.   
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complex) had a higher variable pay component. The simple firms had a higher percentage of the shares held by 
insiders.   
 
Table 1:  Non-Parametric And Parametric Test Of Differences In Board Composition  
And CEO Variable Pay Percentage Between Complex Firms (1) And Simple Firms (0) 
Panel A 
Test Board Size # of Outsiders % of Insiders 
 Score p-value Score p-value Score p-value 
Wilcoxon 0 43.7 <0.0001 0 42.2 <0.0001 0 64.4 0.0083 
1 70.5 1 72.1 1 49.4 
t-test 0 8.1 <0.0001 0 6.1 <0.0001 0 0.25 0.0051 
1 9.9 1 7.9 1 0.20 
 
Panel B 
Test Duality % Pay Variable % Shares Held By Insiders 
 Score p-value Score p-value Score p-value 
Wilcoxon 0 48.0 0.0002 0 39.1 <0.0001 0 64.5 0.0069 
1 67.0 1 66.3 1 49.3 
t-test 0 0.5 0.0002 0 0.40 <0.0001 0 0.38 0.0147 
1 0.8 1 0.64 1 0.26 
Score for t-test represents the mean of the following variables:  board size, number of outsiders, percentage of insiders on board, 
duality, percentage of the CEO pay that is variable and percentage of shares held by insiders. 
 
There are two possible explanations. First, the simpler firms have less independent monitoring (fewer 
outside directors and a higher percentage of insider directors), so aligning the welfare of insiders with that of 
shareholders becomes more important. Second, complex firms are larger, so even if these insiders had the same 
number of shares (as the insiders of simple firms), the percentage ownership would be lower. 
 
Multiple regressions were used to determine the relationship between firm complexity and monitoring and 
bonding mechanisms.  The dependent variable was the factor score
2
.  The results from the regressions are presented 
in Table 2.  Board composition was measured using total number of directors (board size), number of outsiders, and 
percentage of board members that are insiders.  The regressions were generally consistent with the univariate results.  
That is, complex firms had significantly larger boards and a greater number of outside directors.  However, complex 
and simple firms have basically the same percentage of inside board members when other variables are held 
constant. 
 
Regardless of how board composition is measured, complex firms were more likely to structure CEO pay 
with a higher variable component, have higher CEO turnover, older CEOs, and CEOs as chairmen of the board of 
directors.  More complex firms appear to have higher CEO turnover evidenced by the negative and significant 
coefficient on CEO tenure variable. One possible explanation for the higher CEO turnover would be to reduce the 
agency costs associated with entrenchment of long serving CEOs.  Alternatively, the higher CEO turnover could 
also be evidence of greater labor market monitoring where poor performing CEOs have a greater probability of 
losing their jobs (Jensen & Murphy, 1990).   
 
Consistent with the univariate results, the coefficient on the duality variable was positive and highly 
significant; that is, a more complex firm had the CEO and Chairman as the same person.  This would appear to be 
counterintuitive as duality implies less monitoring.  However, the complex firms counter the negative impact of 
duality by having larger boards and more outside directors as monitoring mechanisms.  The complex firms also use 
the bonding mechanism of having a larger component of CEO’s compensation as a variable.  The negative and 
significant coefficient on CEO tenure could indicate that more complex firms are more likely to oust non-
performing CEOs than simpler firms.  Simpler firms appear to rely more on the separation of chairman and CEO as 
a tool to monitor the actions of the CEO.  
                                                 
2 The regressions were also run using the zero/one dummy variable as the dependent variable. The results are essentially the same 
but with lower R2 
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Table 2:  Multiple Regressions Of The Dependent Variable Complexity  
With Board Composition And CEO Characteristics 
Independent Variables #1 # 2 #3 
Intercept -5.01** 
(2.06) 
-6.17** 
(2.42) 
--5.44* 
(1.93) 
% of Shares held by insiders -0.57 
(1.56) 
-0.17 
(0.45) 
-0.05 
(0.11) 
% of compensation variable 0.56* 
(1.80) 
0.69** 
(2.11) 
1.21*** 
(3.56) 
Duality 0.50*** 
(2.62) 
0.58*** 
(2.93) 
0.73*** 
(3.58) 
Log of CEO age 2.89 
(1.18) 
1.07 
(1.62) 
1.25* 
(1.69) 
Log of CEO tenure -0.242*** 
(2.60) 
-0.26*** 
(2.70) 
-0.35*** 
(3.28) 
Board Size 0.23*** 
(5.52) 
  
# of outsiders  0.23*** 
(4.44) 
 
% of insiders on board   -0.65 
(0.57) 
R2 48.5% 43.5% 31.1% 
F 13.99*** 11.4*** 6.72*** 
N 95 95 95 
*,**,*** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. The absolute values of the t statistics are reported 
in parentheses. 
 
Based on the results from the Wilcoxon Rank Sum, the two sample t-tests, and the multiple regressions, we 
are able to reject the first hypothesis – H01 - that there are no differences in corporate governance structures for 
complex and simple firms. We can then conclude that more complex firms in the hospitality industry have different 
governance structures than do simpler hospitality firms.   
 
The linear discriminant function classified the firms into complex or simple based on the following 
characteristics:  percentage of shares held by insiders, percentage of the CEO pay that is variable, duality, CEO’s 
age and tenure, as well as board size, number of outsiders, or the percentage of insiders on the board.  This 
classification was then compared with the original one based on the factor from the analysis.   
 
Based on the linear discriminant function, we were able to identify those firms that were correctly classified 
as simple or complex by both methods.  We also identified those that were misclassified;-that is, firms that were 
classified as complex by one method and simple by the other method and vice versa. Firms that were correctly 
classified were considered to have the optimal monitoring/bonding mechanisms and those firms that were 
misclassified as having sub-optimal monitoring/bonding mechanisms. 
  
The results from the discriminant analysis are provided are Table 3.  The discriminant function did a better 
job of classifying the complex firms correctly. Using board size as a measure of board composition, 79% of the 
complex and simple firms were correctly classified.  Using the number of outsiders 81% and 79% of complex and 
simple firms were classified correctly, while the percentage of insider measure classified 83% and 73% of complex 
and simple firms correctly. 
 
Table 3:  Percentage Of Firm Correctly Classified As Complex  
Or Simple Using On A Linear Discriminant Function Based On Board Composition And Governance Variables 
 Board Size # Of Outsiders % Of Insiders 
Complex 79.2% 81.3% 83.3% 
Simple 79.2% 79.2% 72.9% 
Wilks’ Lambada 0.60*** 0.60*** 0.64*** 
*** significant at the 1% level 
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We used the classifications based on the discriminant analysis using outsiders as a measure of board 
composition
3
 to compute the means and median of the market-to-book value, return on equity (ROE), and return on 
assets (ROA).  We use ROE and ROA to measure the firm’s profitability and market-to-book value as a measure of 
the firm’s valuation. Market-to-book values and their variants have been used extensively in the literature to 
measure firm value (De Andres et al., 2005; Fich and Shivdasani, 2006). The results in Table 4 indicate that, in 
general, the correctly classified firms had higher valuation and profitability measures.  The only exception was the 
mean ROA for the correctly classified complex firms; it was lower than the incorrectly classified ones.  However, 
the median ROA for the complex firms was higher than the incorrectly classified ones.   
 
Table 4:  Descriptive Statistics Of The Firms  
That Were Classified Correctly And Incorrectly By The Discriminant Function 
Simple Firms 
 Correctly Classified Incorrectly Classified 
 Mean Median Mean Median 
Market-to-book -0.10 1.44 -3.26 1.34 
Return on Assets 4.3% 2.5% 3.4% 0.2% 
Return on Equity 1.1% 5.0% -17.9% 0.2% 
 
Complex Firms 
 Correctly Classified Incorrectly Classified 
 Mean Median Mean Median 
Market-to-book 3.57 3.23 3.04 1.64 
Return on Assets 1.4% 3.1% 4.3% 1.0% 
Return on Equity 4.0% 11.0% -1.8% -1.3% 
 
Univariate statistics were used to test whether there are any differences between the market-to-book value, 
ROE and ROA for the firms that were correctly classified and those that were incorrectly classified.  We used non-
parametric tests, as the number of firms in the misclassified cells is small.  The results are shown in Tables 5 and 6. 
 
Although the market book values were higher for the correctly classified firms, there were no significant 
differences between the two groups based on the Wilcoxon Rank Sum or the median tests.  The ROA and ROE were 
significantly larger for both the complex and simple firms that were correctly classified vis a vis those firms that 
were incorrectly classified using the median tests.  The higher profitability for firms that have the appropriate 
governance structure is similar to results reported in Zahra and Pearce (1989) and Khancel (2007), indicating higher 
firm value/profitability with better corporate governance.  However, our results are not consistent with De Andres et 
al. (2005), Staikouras et al. (2007), Agrawal & Knoeber (1996), and Yermack (1996), as they all found lower 
profitability/value with stronger governance mechanisms. It is possible to argue, however, that the latter papers had 
a significant number of simple firms where less stringent corporate governance structures are more appropriate. 
 
Using the classifications from the linear discriminant function and the factor analysis variable, we can 
reject the second hypothesis that there are no differences in profitability measures between firms that were correctly 
classified and those that were misclassified.  Thus, we have some evidence that there is a positive relationship 
between firms that have the appropriate governance structures and the profitability of the firm. 
 
                                                 
3 Using number of board size and percentage of insider directors gave essentially the same results. 
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Table 5 
Non-Parametric Tests Of Differences In Profitability Between Simple Firms That Were Classified As Simple (1) Based 
The Discriminant Functions And Those That Were Classified As Complex (0) By The Discriminant Function 
Test Market-to-book ROA ROE 
 Score p-value Score p-value Score p-value 
Wilcoxon 0 20.1 0.1347 0 20.5 0.1580 0 18.9 0.0794* 
1 25.7 1 25.6 1 26.0 
Median 0 0.5 0.5000 0 0.3 0.0798* 0 0.2 0.0174** 
1 0.5 1 0.6 1 0.6 
Non-Parametric And Parametric Test Of Differences In Profitability Between Complex Firms That Were Classified As 
Simple (0) Based The Discriminant Functions And Those That Were Classified As Complex (1)  
By The Discriminant Function 
Test Market-to-book ROA ROE 
 Score p-value Score p-value Score p-value 
Wilcoxon 0 20.4 0.2432 0 23.2 0.3755 0 19.1 0.0872* 
1 23.7 1 24.8 1 25.9 
Median 0 0.4 0.2642 0 0.3 0.0798* 0 0.3 0.0798* 
1 0.5 1 0.6 1 0.6 
*significant at the 10% level ** significant at the 5% level 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Firms in the hospitality industry are faced with the challenge of being both labor and capital intensive.  The 
typical service firm is usually labor intensive, but generally does not require a large amount of capital (fixed assets).  
A typical manufacturing firm that requires a great deal of capital is usually not labor intensive.  In addition, the 
services provided by hospitality firms are mostly discretionary; hence, the demand for these services will fall a 
substantial amount during periods of low economy activity.  Therefore, it is imperative that firms in the hospitality 
industry adopt corporate governance structures that will minimize agency costs and maximize the firm’s ability to 
make value-creating decisions. 
 
We selected a sample of publicly traded hospitality firms and partitioned them into complex and simple 
firms using the firm’s financing decision, size, and the number of business segments.  We had strong evidence that 
complex firms had larger board of directors, more outside board members, greater fraction of CEO pay being 
variable, and more frequent occurrence of CEO/Chairman duality than simple firms.  We did not find that there were 
significant differences in the fraction of insider directors between complex and simple firms.   
 
Further analysis of the data revealed that complex firms, with corporate governance structures that were 
associated with simple firms, had significantly lower levels of profitability measured, return on assets, and return on 
equity, and lower - but not significantly lower - valuation based on market-to-book value.  Similarly, simple firms 
that had corporate governance structure more suitable for complex firms also had lower market-to-book value and 
significantly lower return on equity and return on assets.  
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APPENDIX B 
 
List Of Hospitality Firms 
 
Ashford Hospitality Trust 
Ameristar Casinos Inc. 
Ceasars Entertainment Corp. 
Choice Hotels Intl. Inc. 
Century Casinos Inc. 
Dover Downs Gaming & Entmt. 
Gaylord Entertainment Co. 
Great Wolf Resorts Inc. 
Hyatt Hotel Corp. 
Isle Of Capri Casinos Inc. 
Las Vegas Sands Corp. 
Marriott Intl. Inc. 
Monarch Casino & Resort Inc. 
Marcus Corp. 
MGM Mirage 
Morgans Hotel Group Co. 
Pinnacle Entertainment Inc. 
Sunstone Hotel Investors Inc. 
Wyndham International Inc. 
Starwood Hotels & Resorts Wrld. 
Wynn Resorts Ltd. 
 
 
